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Abstract
We perform an experimental investigation using a dictator game in which individuals must make a moral decision —
to give or not to give an amount of money to poor people in the Third World. A questionnaire in which the subjects
are asked about the reasons for their decision shows that, at least in this case, moral motivations carry a heavy weight
in the decision: the majority of dictators give the money for reasons of a consequentialist nature. Based on the results
presented here and of other analogous experiments, we conclude that dicator behavior can be understood in terms of
moral distance rather than social distance and that it systematically deviates from the egoism assumption in economic
models and game theory.
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1 Introduction
In standard dictator game (DG) experiments, one of the
players, the dictator, is given a fixed amount of money
and a set of instructions. The instructions explain that the
money has been assigned to two players — the dictator
and the recipient — but that only the dictator is entitled
to decide how much money to keep and how much money
to give to the recipient. In this simple situation, there are
at least three sources of information relevant to the de-
cision: i) information related to the dictator herself, i.e.,
whether or not the decision is observed by others; ii) in-
formation the dictator receives about the recipient; and
iii) information derived from the game framing and the
language used in the instructions.
Previous papers have shown that the outcome of a DG
changes considerably depending on the type of informa-
tion provided by the experimenters. For instance, when
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the dictator makes the decision under conditions of abso-
lute privacy and anonymity and has no information about
the recipient, nearly no one donates anything. Donations
tend to be very low, around 10% of the pie on average
(Hoffman et al., 1994; Hoffman et al., 1996). However,
when the dictator receives reliable information regarding
the recipient, even while keeping anonymity constant, do-
nations increase. When no information is available about
the recipient, the dictator may have doubts as to the recip-
ient’s existence and therefore have no reason to share the
money. In contrast, when dictators were shown pictures
of the recipients in a particular experiment, up to 25% of
the subjects gave as much as half of the total amount, al-
though 58% of them kept all the money for themselves
(Burnham, 2003). In another experiment, the dictators
were told that their donation would be given to the Red
Cross (Eckel & Grossman, 1996). Thirty-one percent of
the dictators in this experiment gave part of the money
(17% gave half of the amount), while 10% gave the full
amount. Offers also increased when the dictators were
told the recipient’s surname (Charness & Gneezy, 2003),
when they received proof of the actual existence of recip-
ients, or when they were told that the recipient was a fel-
low classmate (Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 2001). These
experiments have shown that if conditions of anonymity
are relaxed, e.g., dictator’s behavior or relevant informa-
tion about the recipients are revealed, donations will be
higher, although the full amount of money will never be
donated — with the exception of the Red Cross experi-
ment.
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The language used in the instructions is yet another
factor that may determine the outcome of the experiment.
For example, the fact that subjects are told that they are
participating in an experiment may make them lose inter-
est in their partner, or may cause subjects to feel that they
are playing a game — that it is a competition and they
must therefore win, that is, keep all or part of the money
for themselves (Frohlich et al., 2004). The nature of the
payments, the presence or absence of the experimenters,
the possibility of taking part in future experiments — and
thus winning more money — may also determine the out-
come (Bolton et al., 1998).
The aim of these experiments is to measure the proso-
cial conduct or other-regarding preferences revealed by
the subjects, thus challenging the assumption of self-
interested behavior. The supposition that individuals will
attempt to maximize their own benefits, a standard as-
sumption in economics, could lead to the conclusion that
no one will give anything in the DG since giving noth-
ing is the behavior that maximizes the dictator material’s
payoff. However, as we have seen, subjects often deviate
from this prediction in the laboratory setting. In light of
these experimental results, several hypotheses have been
developed to explain these deviations.
Hoffman et al. (1996) show that as anonymity is re-
laxed, donations increase. In the opinion of these au-
thors, this is due to the fact that anonymity generates “so-
cial distance,” which they define as “the degree of reci-
procity that subjects believe exists within a social interac-
tion” (Hoffman et al., 1996, p. 654). The social isolation
or lack of sense of community produced by anonymity
leads to the predominance of self-interested behavior.
Nonetheless, the hypothesis of social distance has been
widely criticized. The concept of reciprocity, for exam-
ple, is employed in a very broad sense since in reality
the DG does not pose so much a problem of reciprocity
— in that the recipient can do nothing- as one of subject
identifiability. Indeed, it is identifiability that determines
behavior (Bohnet & Frey, 1999).
Many experiments have shown that it is not so much
the degree of dictator anonymity that determines dona-
tions, but rather the information that the dictator has
about the recipient. Thus, for example, in an exten-
sive article in which several hypotheses are reviewed to
explain donations in dictator games and others are pro-
posed, Bolton et al. (1998) argue that, if I know noth-
ing about the other person and if I give her the money,
I can err in her favor, but I prefer to err in my favor be-
cause I am not a saint (the “I’m-no-saint hypothesis”).
According to these authors, however, the hypotheses that
explain DG donations are unclear when the dictator has
information about the recipient. It should be noted that
Bolton et al. (1998) do not find evidence for what they
call the “kindness hypothesis,” according to which “dic-
tators might be motivated to give a gift for one or more
of many reasons: e.g., a sense of moral obligation, plea-
sure derived from giving, to demonstrate kindness” (283).
This hypothesis, however, encompasses very distinct mo-
tivations that must be analyzed separately. Although the
pleasures of giving or demonstrating kindness are greatly
affected by anonymity — in that the recipient not know-
ing if the dictator gives or not takes away the pleasure
of giving and does not allow the dictator to demonstrate
that she is kind — moral obligation is not affected by
anonymity but rather by the lack of information about the
recipient’s actual situation. In the classic Hoffman et al.
(1994) experiment, and in most experiments along these
lines, the complete lack of information about the recipi-
ent removes the necessary conditions to donate out of a
sense of moral obligation:
By imposing double anonymity, HMSS [Hoff-
man et al., 1994] have removed virtually all
motivation for donating money to one’s part-
ner. The decision makers cannot identify each
other, nor do they have enough information to
know if their partner is poor or otherwise de-
serving of their generosity; thus there is little
or no basis for altruism to play a part in the
decision. We assert that fairness and altruism
require context: the circumstances of the recip-
ient determine what is the fair or appropriate
charitable action to take. In the Hoffman et al.
(1994) study, the information available to the
Proposer is unlikely to motivate charitable be-
havior (Eckel & Grossman, 1996, p. 183-184).
If, as Eckel & Grossman have shown, altruistic behav-
ior requires an appropriate context, which is inexistent
in most experiments, what would happen if the dictator
makes a decision in an easily recognizable moral context;
a context in which dictators have information, for exam-
ple, about their partner’s poverty or illness? In Eckel &
Grossman’s experiment, in which the partner is the Red
Cross, donations increase, but not in a spectacular way.
Donations increase much more when the money that the
dictator can distribute is the result of the joint effort of
both the dictator and the partner, given that, in this case,
“social pressures, moral imperatives, and the warm glow
of giving are likely to magnify the reward to skillful or
deserving recipients” (Ruffle, 1998, p. 259). As Ruffle
points out, the results of this experiment contradict Hoff-
man et al.’s claim that other-regarding preferences have
to do with “an expectations phenomenon” and not with
“an autonomous private preference for equity” (Hoffman
et al., 1994, p. 348).
Moral preferences, the sense of moral obligation,
moral imperatives or equity appear repeatedly in discus-
sions on the outcomes of a diverse range of DG exper-
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iments. Yet, in spite of the fact that donations occur in
these experiments, we cannot speak with any certainty
about dictators’ reasons for giving, as the only thing we
know for sure is the preference that has been revealed in
the decision, that is, whether the dictator gave or did not
give. Indeed, aside from the theoretical speculations of
experimenters, we do not know why dictators give. With
a view to bridging this gap, in the following section we
present two experiments (a hypothetical one and a real-
payoffs one) in which the moral context is easily recog-
nizable and in which dictators are expressly asked about
the reasons for their action. We can then determine if
the “kindness hypothesis” is to some degree certain: ei-
ther because the dictators take pleasure in giving, give
to demonstrate kindness, or give out of a sense of moral
obligation. In the third section, we discuss these results
and defend the hypothesis that dictators’ responses are
determined by the “moral distance” between the dictator
and the recipient, a distance that permits us to classify the
behaviors that may arise in the dictator game.
2 Two moral dictator games: De-
sign and results
To analyze how much the number of donors and the size
of donations increase in a moral context, we need to study
a DG situation in which the moral structure of the prob-
lem is set out in a clear manner. This requires dicta-
tors having relevant moral information about the recipi-
ent, that is, a context in which they are able to identify
the moral nature of their decision. The instructions must
prevent dictators from thinking that they are just play-
ing a game, or that the recipients do not actually exist.
The two experiments reported in Brañas-Garza (2006)
and presented below fulfil these conditions.
2.1 Design and quantitative results of the
experiments1
The first experiment was conducted with 77 students from
the University of Córdoba (Spain) in November 2002.
Subjects were asked to collaborate in a research study
on the problems that arise when trying to distribute non-
divisible and finite goods. We avoided using the term
“experiment” in order to dispel the possible negative ef-
fects of the word. Once the study was explained, the sub-
jects received a large envelope containing the following
items: a small envelope, three 5C bills, a questionnaire,
1This section (2.1) is simply a summary of the data analyzed in depth
in Brañas-Garza (2006). This is necessary so that the reader can gain a
better understanding of the analysis of the qualitative data that were not
included in the work by Brañas-Garza and that we discuss here. For the
statistical analysis of both experiments see Brañas-Garza (2006).
instructions and a sheet with 341 numerical codes, three
of which were marked with a circle. The size of the en-
velope permitted the subjects to carry out the operations
in complete privacy. The money and the questionnaire
were placed in the small envelope where the centers were
marked. The subjects then stood up and placed the enve-
lope in a box. The subjects’ names did not appear any-
where and they kept the large envelope. After they were
given the instructions they were told the following: “Only
you will know what is in the large envelope” (the money
that remained). After allocating the money, the subjects
stood up, placed the small, sealed envelope (containing
their choice, the money and the questionnaire) in the box
and left the room. The subjects were not paid for partici-
pating in the experiment. None of the researchers (exper-
imenters) that ran the experiment were professors at the
universities where the experiments were performed and
had not had any previous contact with the students.
In the instructions, the students were informed that the
341 codes appearing on the sheet referred to centers that
receive medicines in Asia, Africa and South America,
that they had been assigned three of these centers, and
that for every 5C they donated, a box of medicines would
be sent to one of “their” three centers. All of the sub-
jects in the experiment had to write the three codes on
their small envelope and circle the centers — a maximum
of three — to which they allotted the 5C in medicines.
The subjects were also told that they were entitled to keep
5C for participating in the research study on the distribu-
tion of goods. Logically, if they kept 5C for themselves,
one of the centers would not receive any medicines (in
this case they were told to circle only two of the three
centers that had been assigned to them).2 The procedure
was performed under conditions of complete anonymity
by means of a double-blind mechanism similar to that de-
scribed by Hoffman et al. (1996).
The questionnaire included questions regarding sex,
age, the weekly allowance given to them by their parents
(none of the experimental subjects — all of whom were
university students — had a paying job), and the reasons
for their decision. This last question reads: “Could you
please tell me the reasons for your decision in the prob-
lem posed here?”
Using the same instructions and under identical condi-
tions of anonymity, a second experiment was performed
in March 2003 with 98 students from the University of
Jaén (Spain). The subjects were placed in four groups.
This experiment was hypothetical as the subjects were
not given real money and had to decide how to divide the
2Since there is no reason to favor one recipient over another, partici-
pants’ generous behavior may be also motivated by the desire of treating
the three recipients equaly. Although this might affect the quantitative
results, it does not affect the main point of this paper, that is, the reasons
subjects state to justify their behavior.
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15 0% 40.8% 68.3% 74.6%
10 0% 25.5% 18.3% 12.0%
5 28.6% 11.2% 5.1% 10.7%
0 71.4% 22.4% 8.1% 2.7%
N 98 98 98 75
1 There are not significant differences in dona-
tions between the real-payoff experiment and the
“Poverty+Drugs” treatment of the hypothetical exper-
iment (see Brañas-Garza, 2006).
amount hypothetically by responding to a series of ques-
tions. Furthermore, the decision was made under three
distinct scenarios which were presented to them in a ran-
dom manner:
a) No information about the recipients.
b) Information revealing that the recipients were poor
people from the Third World.
c) Similar to b, but informing subjects that the money
would be used to buy medicines.
The main results of the experiments are shown in Ta-
ble 1. As can be observed, the increase in the number
of donors and donations is spectacular compared to other
experiments (see Section 1). As occurs in all the exper-
iments, when subjects lack information about the recip-
ient they hardly give anything. However, as in this case
they knew that the recipients were poor, or poor and in
need of medicines, the majority of dictators gave all the
money — in spite of the fact that they were told in the
instructions that they could legitimately keep one 5C bill
for participating and donate the other two. As we will
see below, some of them did in fact keep the money, but
only a few. Thus, information about partners clearly has
an effect on donations to the same or to a larger degree
than dictator anonymity. But what drives dictators to do-
nate? What motives do they give for doing so — tastes,
customs, traditions, religious motives, or moral reasons?
The next subsection explores the main reasons given by
the participants in both experiments.
2.2 Qualitative results
As we have pointed out in the introduction, in this pa-
per we are interested in how subjects explain their behav-
ior after taking part in a dictator game. To this end, the
experiments considered here are particularly appropriate
since contrary to standard experimental dictator games,
our experiments trigger an amazing amount of altruistic
behavior. But before analyzing the claims made by the
subjects, let us recall two features of the experimental de-
sign that have contributed to the prominence of unselfish
behaviors. Whereas the first is a just a methodological
question, the second leads us to the kind of philosophical
claim that we shall make in this paper.
Firstly, the results are somewhat special because par-
ticipants did not face the standard continuum choice of
how to divide a pie, but instead had to decide how to dis-
tribute three 5C bills among different potential recipients
(see Brañas-Garza 2006). As we can observe in Table
1, the majority of participants (75%) allocate the full en-
dowment to the recipients in the real-payoffs experiment.
This is quite interesting for our analysis as it permits us to
explore the reasons of a large number of participants who
decided to give the money. Secondly, and more interest-
ingly, the experiment used a “moral frame,” the kind of
design that allows moral motivations such as fairness and
altruism to play a role (Eckel & Grossman, 1996). Thus,
although these are rather atypical dictator results, they are
the kind of results that permit us to explore moral motiva-
tions in depth. Having clarified this, we will now concen-
trate on the main arguments provided by the participants.
2.2.1 The prominence of consequentialist arguments
Consequentialist reasons predominate among the an-
swers given by participants in both the real-payoffs and
the hypothetical experiment. The dictators give all the
money because giving it has the most beneficial outcomes
in terms of satisfying needs. In the real-payoffs exper-
iment, 60% of the participants provide a consequential-
ist argument (see Table 2). The complete list of answers
given by participants in the real-payoffs experiment can
be found in the Appendix.3
As we will see below, the immense majority of those
who gave all the money appealed to moral, consequen-
tialist or deontological reasons.4 The former are more
concerned about what would have happened had they not
given the money (or what happens if they do), while the
latter are more concerned about what they should do. Re-
sponses based on reasons of solidarity, equity, generosity
or a sense of humanity are labelled as deontological. Al-
though we believe that these labels are not particularly
precise — dictators do not theorize, but express the rea-
sons for their decision — a clear difference can be seen
3Responses were categorized by the third author.
4Of the 55 cases that justified their donation in moral terms, only
three kept the 5 euros (see Table 4). We do not include them in the “le-
gitimacy” category because they do not justify the legitimacy of keeping
part of the money, but the moral reasons for giving the rest of it.
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Table 2: Reasons given by subjects in both experiments.
Real Hypothetical1
Reason N % N %
Consequentialist 41 59.4 68 79.1
Deontological 14 20.3 4 4.6
Didn’t trust the system 4 5.8 3 3.5
Legitimacy 3 4.3 3 3.5
Random decision 3 4.3 0 0
Didn’t trust the experiment 2 2.9 0 0
Egoism/Hardship 2 2.9 8 9.3
Total2 69 100.0 86 100.0
1 The reasons from the hypothetical experiment corre-
spond to the treatment in which the participants have
full information. We report only this treatment to make
it comparable with the real-payoffs experiment.
2 The number of answers is restricted to 69 and 86
in the real-payoffs and the hypothetical experiment re-
spectively since the rest of participants did not provide
any explanation for their action.
between those who underline the beneficial consequences
of the action and those who appeal to the duty of giving.
The remaining labels reflect the various justifications
provided by the dictators for giving the full amount or
not giving anything. Thus, for example, some consider
it legitimate to not give all the money (“legitimacy”) be-
cause the experimental instructions permit them to do so:
“You are entitled to keep five euros, although this amount
will depend on your decision [remember that everything
is absolutely anonymous].” It is interesting to note that
a large majority of the experimental subjects did not take
this rule or “right” into account and instead gave all the
money, explaining their action in moral terms of a con-
sequentialist or deontological nature. Others, however,
made their decisions in a random manner, did not believe
in the experiment, did not believe that the money would
reach its destination and thus did not give the money,
or justified their decision for clearly self-interested rea-
sons. Nonetheless, the justifications given for keeping
part or all of the money are so varied and disperse that
they become quite insignificant in comparison to the con-
sequentialist or deontological reasons revealed by those
who gave the full amount.
These results are confirmed by the findings obtained in
the hypothetical experiment. Similar to what occurs in
the first experiment, the majority of participants (79%) in
the second experiment provide a consequentialist reason
similar to that of the real-payoffs experiment (see Table
2). Again the majority provided a moral reason to jus-
Table 3: Moral reasons and behavior.
Number of bills given
Having a reason 0 1 2 3 Total
No reason 2 7 7 4 20
Reason 0 0 3 52 55
tify giving all the money, although on this occasion the
cases of self-interest increase, while those appealing to
deontological reasons decrease. This may be due to the
hypothetical nature of the experiment as it is more likely
that dictators will keep all or part of the money when the
decision does not have real consequences: as no money
is involved, no one who is needy will lose out. The data,
however, do not permit us to reach definitive conclusions
on this question.
2.2.2 The importance of having a moral reason
Having a (moral) reason is decisive when facing a DG
decision. In Table 3 the behavior of those who provide a
moral reason — either consequentialist or deontological
— is compared with the behavior of those who do not
provide this kind of reason.
Almost all the participants who give the three 5C bills
provide a moral reason for their behavior. Of course,
this reveals nothing about the direction of the causality
and we cannot claim that their behavior is grounded in
moral reasons. But at least we can say that when they
have to justify their actual behavior they use a moral ar-
gument. Moreover, the difference in giving behavior be-
tween those who provide a moral reason and those who
do not is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney U-test:
z = −6.65, p < 0.001).
2.2.3 Behavioral differences between moral reasons
Having a moral reason to act is important in a dictator
game, but are different reasons related to different types
of behavior? In other words, does the giving behavior of
those who provide a consequentialist reason differs from
the behavior of those who provide a deontological rea-
son? Since all the participants that provide a moral reason
a posteriori give at least two bills, in Table 4 we study if
there are differences between consequentialist and deon-
tological subjects when deciding whether to allocate two
or three bills to the recipient.
These results clearly show that the behavior of partici-
pants who provide a consequentialist reason do not differ
from the behavior of those who provide a deontological
reason (Mann-Whitney U-test: z = −0.319, p = 0.750).
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Table 4: Differences in giving between consequentialists
and deontologists.
Number of bills given
Reason 2 3 Total
Consequentialist 2 39 41
Deontological 1 13 14
When carefully analyzing all of the answers given
by consequentialists and deontological subjects, we find
only a minor difference, yet it is one that can be interest-
ing from a philosophical point of view. There is a positive
correlation between considering that the dictator experi-
ment constitutes a “cheap decision”5 and giving a con-
sequentialist argument (see Table 5). This correlation is
statistically significant (χ2 = 7.359, p = 0.007).6 Al-
though we did not have a priori a theory about why these
two variables should be related, and therefore it is a post
hoc correlation, this result allows as to go further in our
speculation about subjects’ moral reasons.
This can be explained by the fact that here we find two
distinct types of consequentialism (Mulgan, 2001): al-
most half of those who give all the money in the real-
payoffs experiment (49%) justify their decision in terms
of a non-neutral consequentialism and one-third (32%)
justify the reasons for their choice in terms of a neu-
tral or impersonal consequentialism restricted to imper-
sonal values. Neutral consequentialism is clearly pre-
sented by the subjects as the maximization of the imper-
sonal value in statements such as “the more people that
have medicines the better” or “this money is more useful
in these countries” or “their scarcity.” Non-neutral con-
sequentialism is demonstrated in the choice of an action
that produces the best outcome, including one which will
benefit the agent. The experimental subjects manifested
this in statements such as “I’m not losing anything,” “the
money isn’t mine, I didn’t earn it,” “they need it more
than me,” “it’s of more use to them than to me,” “it’s not
going to do me any good,” “it benefits them more than
me,” or “I didn’t have the money when I came and I still
don’t.” When ranking the possible outcomes from best to
worst, non-neutral consequentialists consider that keep-
ing all or part of the money does not benefit them in any
way whatsoever — donating, then, is a cheap decision,
even a morally cheap one.
5This information (the decision being cheap) is also derived from
the open-ended question answered by subjects after taking part in the
experimental sessions.
6A Fisher’s Exact Test provides the same p-value.
Table 5: Considering the DG a cheap decision by moral
reason.
Number of bills given
Reason Not cheap Cheap Total
Consequentialist 18 23 41
Deontological 12 2 14
2.2.4 Moral framing and consequentialist reasons
The “moral framing” used in our experiment is a crucial
part of the experimental design. Above we described how
moral framing increases donations in a standard dictator
game. In addition, we explained how this moral fram-
ing triggers participants’ moral reasons, especially con-
sequentialist ones. In this last part of the results we use
the data from the hypothetical experiment to show how
consequentialist arguments are more common, the more
morally loaded the framing.
Figure 1 plots the reasons given by subjects to rational-
ize their behavior in the hypothetical experiment. In this
case, we have categorized the reasons given by subjects
when facing the three different treatments: without moral
framing, knowing that recipients are poor and knowing
this fact and additionally knowing that the money will
be used to buy medicines. Figure 1 chiefly reveals three
facts. First, when subjects do not receive any informa-
tion about the recipients, almost 70% of them use this
“lack of information” argument to justify their (mainly
self-interested) behavior. Second, when they know that
the money will be sent to poor countries, but do not know
exactly where the money will end up, 20% of them do not
trust the system. In other words, they are not sure if the
money will be used for a good purpose. Third, the more
information they have, the more frequent the consequen-
tialist reasons. Thus, whereas almost no subject gives a
consequentialist reason when having no information, this
proportion rises to 50% when they know the recipients
are poor and to 70% when they know the money will be
spent to buy medicines. Consequentialist arguments are
backed here by efficiency arguments, because morality is
not a matter of wasting resources.
Donating money for medicines reduces the uncertainty
of the dictator’s decision, improving the probability that
her decision would have good consequences. Therefore,
consequentialist arguments increase when the money is
spent in medicines.
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Figure 1: Reasons by treatment in the hypothetical experiment.
3 Discussion: Social distance or
moral distance?
Eckel & Grossman’s claim that if dictators are provided
the appropriate context they will have reasons to donate
is more than fulfilled in Brañas-Garza (2006), albeit the
result would have to be supported by further “moral” ex-
periments. On the other hand, it may be too hasty to reject
the kindness hypothesis if we focus on one aspect of this
hypothesis, that is, dictators’ sense of moral obligation.
Let us explore this aspect in greater detail.
First, like in many experiments, Brañas-Garza (2006)
finds that dictator anonymity is not a crucial variable to
understanding how much and why dictators donate. The
key informational variable is the knowledge that dictators
have about their partners. Similar to what occurs in the
majority of experiments with DGs, in our hypothetical
experiment, dictators hardly donate anything when the
dictator lacks information about the recipient. But this is
not due to a problem of social distance, lack of reciprocity
or isolation. Those who lacked information explained
their decision with statements such as “I don’t know who
is going to get it, they might have more than me,” “I might
need it for something more important than the recipients,”
“if I don’t have any information about who the money is
going to or what it is going to be used for, I won’t donate
it” or “it could be someone who is richer than me,” state-
ments which were repeated time and again to justify their
action. When information about the recipient is lacking,
it is perfectly legitimate to give priority to oneself: if the
money goes to someone who needs it less than I do, I
would be doing an injustice to myself. Thus it has less
to do with a question of social distance than the fact that
dictators make and analyze their decision whilst bearing
in mind that they live in an unfair society in which it is
quite likely that the unknown recipient will be better off
economically than they are. In such a case there is no
moral obligation to give anything.7
Drawing on Hoffman, McCabe and Smith’s concept of
social distance, we propose a definition of moral distance
as the degree of moral obligation that the dictator has to-
wards the recipient. If the experiment is designed in such
a way that donating is an actual obligation, the moral dis-
tance will be null and the dictator ought to donate all or
part of her resources according to her level of well-being.
In such a situation the dictator has the actual obligation
to donate since it “is an obligation which, in a particu-
lar situation, is not superseded by any other obligation”
7Of course this does not exclude generosity. In our hypothetical
experiment no less than 28.6% of the subjects donate one-third of the
money in spite of having no information about the recipient. In Hoffman
et al. (1994), eight per cent of the dictators donated half or less than half
of the money.
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(Crawford, 1969, p. 316; Zimmerman, 1996: 26). If the
particular situation is such that donating cannot be said to
be an obligation at all, the moral distance will be maxi-
mum.
The distance between dictator and recipient is not
greater or lesser only as a function of the reciprocity that
subjects belief exist within a social interaction, as in Hoff-
man, McCabe and Smith’s definition of social distance
(Hoffman et al., 1996, p. 654). In fact, the concept of
reciprocity depends on the concept of obligation — cases
of reciprocity are those in which if you give me, I should
give you; if I help you, you should help me, etc. But
then social distance is only a case of moral distance, a
special case in which anonymity plays a crucial, nega-
tive role, for the dictator must know what the recipient
has done for him before to donate or not donate — as in
Ruffle experiment (Ruffle, 1998). This negative relation
— more anonymity less reciprocity — is not present in
most instances of moral distance, for it is not true that
more anonymity leads to a lesser obligation to donate
when moral distance is null, and it is not true that less
anonymity leads to more obligation to donate when the
moral distance is maxim. However, anonymity must be
ensured in order to exclude any possible influence of rep-
utation (I give so that others see that I am giving).
Nor is moral distance related to the personal closeness
between the dictator and recipient: the dictator can do-
nate more money to a stranger than to an acquaintance if
the stranger needs it, however close they may be. Fol-
lowing upon Jonathan Glover, Abelson (2005) refers to
moral distance as “the emotional closeness between agent
and beneficiary” and states that “our moral obligations to
aid vary in strength with the emotional closeness to us of
our fellows. When we know whom we are aiding, that
very fact brings our beneficiaries closer to us than un-
known strangers, and we feel more responsible for their
well being” (Abelson, 2005, p. 35). In the experiments
analyzed here, there is no emotional closeness between
the dictator and the recipient. It has nothing to do with
knowing who the recipient is, but the recipient’s state of
well being. Given that the recipient is badly off, there
is an obligation to help; an obligation which some fulfill
— the majority in this case — and others do not. It is
this obligation, and not emotional ties, what establishes
the moral distance between dictator and recipient. Moral
distance depends on the relevant information that the dic-
tator has regarding the recipient’s situation and regarding
her own situation.
The freedom that the dictator has to give or not give
and the greater or lesser moral distance between the dicta-
tor and the recipient permits the behavior of the dictators
to be labelled in the following way.
a) If the moral distance between the dictator and the re-
cipient is null and the donations are also null or
very low, the dictator behaves in a morally egotis-
tical manner.
b) If the moral distance between the dictator and the re-
cipient is maximum and the dictator donates noth-
ing at all, the dictator behaves as a reasonably self-
interested individual.
c) If the moral distance between the dictator and the re-
cipient is maximum and the dictator gives part or all
of her money, she performs an act of generosity.
d) If the moral distance between the dictator and the re-
cipient is null and the dictator gives part or all of her
money, her behavior is morally right.
Note that we are speaking about labelling dictator be-
havior, not about the reasons for action. We judge behav-
ior from the viewpoint of the observer (the experimenter),
from the outside, from the point of view of one who ob-
serves the moral distance between the dictator and the re-
cipient and if the dictator gives money or not. The reasons
for action are unknown: perhaps the dictator gave all the
money — when, for example, moral distance is null —
because the experiment was conducted on a Monday, or
perhaps she gives part of the money when the moral dis-
tance is at its maximum because she was happy. What-
ever the reasons may be for action, behavior can be la-
belled from the viewpoint of the experimenter, as we did
so above. Given the manner in which DG experiments are
usually conducted, it is not possible to determine the rea-
sons for action, that is, the internal perspective of the dic-
tator. It is possible to observe only the dictator’s conduct
and speculate on her motives. What we can assert, how-
ever, is that first, the behavior of many dictators deviates
from money maximization; second, that social distance
does not explain why dictators donate and third, that the
labels proposed here seem to fit the range of behaviors
revealed in all the DG experiments (moral behavior, gen-
erosity, reasonable self-interest, selfish behavior). These
labels respond to moral distance and donations; two ob-
jective categories that are independent of motivations.
It is interesting to note that all of these behaviors figure
in the vast literature on DGs, albeit they appear separately
in a variety of experiments. We have seen, for exam-
ple, how dictators act with reasonable self-interest when
lacking information given that in a situation of this type
they are morally distant from the recipient. Self-interest
works here as a social norm (Miller, 1999) that permits
the dictators to take care of themselves without being la-
belled as selfish, that is, behaving in a morally egotistical
manner. Even so, generosity is possible as some dicta-
tors donate part of the money to an unknown recipient
in a double-blind DG. Likewise, when dictators have to
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divide legitimately earned money with the recipient they
hardly donate anything — 95% of the dictators keep the
full amount of money (Cherry et al., 2002, p. 1218). In
such a case, there is no actual obligation to donate since
the dictator obtained the money through her own personal
effort. Here the moral distance with the partner is maxi-
mum, therefore making it legitimate to defend one’s own
interests.8 For whatever the reason, moral conduct arises
in experiments in which either the dictator has to divide
the money that she has produced with her partner (Ruffle,
1998) or if she has to give money to alleviate poverty and
buy medicines (Brañas-Garza 2006). On these occasions
moral distance is null and there is an actual obligation to
donate; an obligation that the dictators usually fulfill.9 In
these cases we also find self-interested behavior. Given
that the moral distance is null, there are those who keep
all the money. When we modify the circumstances sur-
rounding the decision, we will have both different moral
distances and different outcomes.
Unlike what occurs in other experiments, here we have
attempted to approach the internal perspective of the dic-
tator, that is, the reasons that drive the dictator’s behav-
ior, to see if behavior and motivations merge, in other
words, if dictators donate money for moral reasons when
moral distance is null. While the quantitative analysis
by Brañas-Garza (2006) found a spectacular increase in
donations when reducing the moral distance between the
dictator and the recipient, the analysis of the qualitative
data presented here shows that the dictators — without
previous agreement, without communicating with one an-
other and under conditions of absolute anonymity- ap-
peal to moral motivations such as solidarity or helping
the needy to justify their decision. To put it another way,
fulfilling one’s obligation to give does not seem to be a
random choice nor the result of non-moral reasons, but
of moral reasons. Dictators seem to “measure” moral
distance well as they refuse to give money when they
have no information about the recipient, but do give it
when they know the recipient is poor or is poor and needs
medicine. In our experiments the response (to give or not
to give) to the greater or lesser moral distance is generally
tied to moral motivations.
Because the justification is given following the DG, we
can argue that this is a mere post-hoc verbal justification
that does not imply that the behavior we call moral is ac-
tually the result of a moral judgement (Haidt, 2001). As
we stated above that, the experiment analyzed here does
8Quite another thing is if the dictator obtains the money by her own
means and is then told that she has to divide it with a poor recipient or
a poor and ill recipient.
9This does not mean that those who give nothing are selfish: their
behavior may respond to the fact that they do not believe in the experi-
ment or do not believe that the money will reach its destination. In such
a case their conduct would be reasonably self-interested. But in order
to determine this we must know the reasons for action.
not allow us to establish a causal link between such be-
havior and the post hoc explanation for this behavior. But
perhaps this is not the proper way to approach this issue.
As Scanlon argues, judgements on what is correct or in-
correct are not normal empirical judgements, but “claims
about what we have reasons to do” (Scanlon, 1998, p. 2).
The fact that the experimental subjects who donated all
the money coincide in their reasons for action; a coinci-
dence that occurs without previous agreement or group
negotiation and pressure, seems to support the reasons
the dictators gave for donating in the specific context pro-
posed to them. Although these are undoubtedly post hoc
reasons and we cannot affirm that they cause the action
without committing a fallacy, there can be no doubt that
it is quite a different ball game when dictators say they
give money because their partner needs it than when they
make their decision by tossing a coin in the air. The part-
ner’s poverty seems to be sufficient grounds for the dicta-
tor to believe that she should donate in a specific situation
and for her to indeed donate.
There may be other circumstances in which the dicta-
tors give and yet their behavior could be labelled as ego-
tistical, since as we have seen the decision comes cheap:
the money they donate has come at no cost to themselves
and as many state, “won’t do them much good.” In such
circumstances morally correct behavior is cheap. Perhaps
this explains the high number of non-neutral consequen-
tialist responses that we detected in both experiments.
Whatever the case may be, it is interesting to confirm the
coherency of the labels we have chosen to use since those
who appeal to reasons of a deontological nature do not
consider if their decision is cheap or not, but rather the
duty of giving. This is yet another indication that these
are true reasons for action; a fact that would in turn sup-
port the hypothesis that it is moral distance — the sense
of obligation of the kindness hypothesis — and not so-
cial distance which marks the difference in experimental
DGs. What seems to be unquestionable is that the moral
framing determines dictators’ decisions. However, it is
necessary to investigate further to understand better the
influence of moral distance in the dictator’s behavior, and
the relationship of this concept with other concepts and
hypothesis used to explain donations in DGs.
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Appendix: Reasons given by subjects
in the real experiment
In the following, “Cons” means consequentialist; “De-
ont” means deontological; “Rand” means random de-
cision; “Trust” means “Did not trust the experiment”;
“Trust2” means “Didn’t trust the system”; “Legit” means








1 The more people with medicines
the better
Cons 3
2 I don’t believe in the aim of the ex-
periment
Trust 0
3 Solidarity Deont 3
4 We all should give some money to
put an end to injustice
Deont 3
5 This money is more useful in these
countries
Cons 3
6 Their scarcity Cons 3
7 I can help them Cons 3
8 Solidarity Deont 3
9 I can help them Cons 3
10 They need it Cons 3
11 I can help them Cons 3
12 I believe being fair is the best de-
cision
Deont 3
13 I prefer [. . . ] donating the money
personally
Trust2 1
14 They need it Cons 2
15 I can help them Cons 3
16 I can help them Cons 3
17 I can help them Cons 3
18 I have enough Cons 3
19 They need it Cons 3
20 They need it Cons 3
21 Solidarity, ethic principles Deont 3
22 I don’t trust in some organizations Trust2 2
23 2
24 I’m keeping what’s mine Legit 2
25 They need it Cons 3
26 Problems to distribute the money
among recipients
Trust2 1
27 My decision has been random Rand 2
28 This money is more useful in these
countries
Cons 3
29 Sharing the money that’s not mine Legit 2
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Sub-
ject





31 I don’t trust anybody, I only trust
myself
Trust2 1
32 I don’t need the money Cons 3
33 My motivation has been to earn
some extra money
Ego 1
34 This money is more useful in these
countries
Cons 3
35 Less for some people but
medicines for all
Cons 3
36 We all are all human Deont 3
37 We all should go for the same in-
terest
Deont 3
38 I don’t need the money Cons 3
39 The importance of poverty in the
Third World
Cons 2
40 The money is for a good deed Deont 2
41 I don’t know whether [the experi-
ment] is real or not
Trust 1
42 Generosity Deont 3
43 A good cause Deont 3
44 I don’t need the money Cons 3
45 3
46 I don’t need the money Cons 3
47 1
48 3
49 Helping those who are most needy Cons 3
50 Higher utility Cons 3
51 Just to put 3 numbers Rand 3
Sub-
ject




52 My own personality, my family,
my education. . .
Deont 3
53 I don’t need the money Cons 3
54 I can’t give to one center and not
to the others
Deont 3
55 I don’t need the money Cons 3
56 I need the money Ego 1
57 I don’t need the money Cons 3
58 1
59 Good Cons 3
60 Everyone has to have the same op-
portunities
Deont 3
61 The 15C are just to pay for my
participation in a statistical study
Legit 0
62 I don’t need the money Cons 3
63 Higher utility Cons 3
64 They need it Cons 3
65 They need it Cons 3
66 I don’t need the money Cons 3
67 I don’t need the money Cons 3
68 They need it Cons 3
69 The best use for the money Cons 3
70 If we all donate, .., there will be
less poverty
Cons 3
71 They need it Cons 3
72 I don’t need the money Cons 3
73 They need it Cons 3
74 To help someone in any case Deont 3
75 I have given the money randomly Rand 2
